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Satellite Broadcasting as Trade Routes in the Sky
Abstract
The metaphor of trade routes - used from time to time to think about the distribution of ideas and imagery -
ought to nourish our conception of transnational paths of delivery of electronic communications. Our minds
are full of Rupert Murdoch and Disney, CNN and the BBC as traders in information, great shippers of data,
distributors of sitcoms and news and advertisements. In the common reading of the world of electronic
signals, the media is considered "global," and the general impression is of a constant and ever-present net that
can deposit information everywhere, disregarding boundaries. Our common and most recent experiences
with the Internet seem, at first blush, to confirm and underscore a belief that data careers around the world
from server to server, in patterns that seem virtually impervious to purposive planning or political and legal
intervention (Volokh, 1995). Sender and receiver are linked in ways that appear indifferent to the route or
mode by which they are connected. The obsolescence of boundaries is reinforced. So, too, has been the effect
of the seamlessness of telephony in the developed world, obliterating distance and time. In telephony,
transmission pathways seem invisible, or at least irrelevant, to the substantive decisions of most users.
Although users are almost never conscious of it, all these modes of communication (postal service, telegrams
and telephones) required the construction of international systems of regulation. Assurance of adherence to
worldwide standards was a condition for their instantaneous nature and compatibility. The predominance of
the West in terms of development and control of access to technology dictated the change in structure of
international communication, putting pressure on non-Western members to Westernize, in order to comply
with the prevailing system's bureaucratic rules.
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Chapter 9
Satellite Broadcasting as Trade
Routes in the Sky
Monroe E. Price
The metaphor of trade routes-used from time to time to think about the
distribution of ideas and imagery-ought to nourish our conception of
transnational paths of delivery of electronic communications. Our minds
are full of Rupert Murdoch and Disney, CNN and the BBC as traders in
information, great shippers of data, distributors of sitcoms and news and
advertisements. In the common reading of the world of electronic signals,
the media is considered "global," and the general impression is of a con-
stant and ever-present net that can deposit information everywhere, disre-
garding boundaries. Our common and most recent experiences with the
Internet seem, at first blush, to confirm and underscore a belief that data
careers around the world from server to server, in patterns that seem vir-
tually impervious to purposive planning or political and legal intervention
(Volokh, 1995). Sender and receiver are linked in ways that appear indif-
ferent to the route or mode by which they are connected. The obsolescence
of boundaries is reinforced. So, too, has been the effect of the seamlessness
of telephony in the developed world, obliterating distance and time. In
telephony, transmission pathways seem invisible, or at least irrelevant, to
the substantive decisions of most users. Although users are almost never
conscious of it, all these modes of communication (postal service, telegrams
and telephones) required the construction of international systems of reg-
ulation. Assurance of adherence to worldwide standards was a condition
for their instantaneous nature and compatibility. The predominance of the
West in terms of development and control of access to technology dictated
the change in structure of international communication, putting pressure
on non-Western members to Westernize, in order to comply with the pre-
vailing system's bureaucratic rules. 1
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Central to this vision is the idea that the world's electronic umbrella is
such that information and data are ubiquitous, capable of distribution
everywhere, even if there are inequities in the manner and pattern of
uploading and gaps in the earthbound infrastructure to receive them. But
satellite routes for the distribution of images-even though digitally com-
municated-are neither entirely random nor random in the sense of indif-
ference to historic and arbitrary boundaries of nation-states. Rather, as
with their nautical counterparts for ports of call, certain orbital slots for
communications satellites have advantages over other information routes.
It is no longer fear of pirates or factors equally cinematographic that help
determine a choice of passage. Nevertheless, issues of security in carrying
goods (in the case of the satellites, information) over long distances in un-
policed areas (here, the upper atmosphere) are just as apparent now as they
were to the historical trade in material goods. Similarly, satellite technology
generates the need for zones of neutrality, though here we look at the
allocation of orbital slots and issues of international regulation, rather than
the neutral ground for trade provided by ancient ports of calF What the
new factors are, and how governments and businesses interact to shape the
value of one route as opposed to another, are still open questions. Because
these routes leave no marks and little in the way of associated activity, how
these routes develop-and the impact of having one route rather than an-
other-have not been examined.
Information is so valuable a commodity in the late twentieth century,
and trade in information such a growing part of world balances and defi-
cits, that it is productive to examine the metaphor of trade routes as a
means of understanding current practices in law and regulation. It is for
that reason that this chapter looks at the history of early eighteenth-century
shipping routes as a source for common themes and major differences. This
chapter, thus, explores the conceit that satellite patterns are trade routes
that have their own agonizing histories and their own differentiated im-
pacts. In the past, a trade route was an associated set of points which
permitted ships to travel, receive coal for refueling, and to provide water,
food and recreation for the sailors-in short, all stops necessary for goods
to travel from Location A to Location B (and C and D), usually with the
return of other goods (raw materials or manufactures). A good part of the
history of colonialism can be read as the efforts of manufacturing and
trading states to gain power or sovereignty over these points that were key
to the maintenance of trading routes.
Along the coasts, these harbors were links in a complicated chain. Often,
first a monopoly trading company and then a colonial power gained full
dominion and sovereignty over the particular points in the trade routes
(Auber, 1828; Horrabin, 1936; Juriaanse, 1943; Van Cleef, 1937). There
were negotiations between the trader (or the government of the trader) and
the local authority (king, tribe, city or otherwise). The reliable existence of
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these points was essential to investment and to the success of the trade.
Sovereign entities often sought certain benefits for the concession, some-
times financial, sometimes otherwise (Kumar, 1996; Quiggin, 1949; Ray-
chaudhuri, 1962). Points on ancient trade routes were valuable because raw
materials could be added there as vessels moved from place to place. Since
ancient times, trade routes favored ports that opened up to large consuming
markets as well as ports where raw material could be taken on.
Today, satellites and their orbital slots constitute the points necessary for
delivery of video (and other) signals over long distances. The trade route
that information follows is superficially very different from its nautical
predecessors. Because the process is electronic, painless, free of manual la-
bor, and invisible, no novels-science fiction aside-will be written about
information trade routes. No Herman Melville of global transmissions will
arise. Lives are not risked. No coaling stations are required as intermediate
stops between the original ports of debarkation and the ultimate ports of
call. The economic need for two-way traffic is diminished because the costs
of an empty ship returning are not present. With respect to the information
colonies, the new order seems to deliver a manufactured product but ap-
pears not to obtain raw materials, a pattern strikingly different from the
eighteenth-century model.
Yet the similarities between ancient trade routes and modern ones have
the potential to instruct. The current powerful generation of communica-
tions satellites is located in a precise and limited geostationary orbit above
the Equator, the only orbit that allows continuous contact between a sat-
ellite and a single ground station. Slots on this orbit are finite and, as a
result, contested, bargained for and, to some extent, colonized (Finch,
1986). Particular orbital slots are often more important than others because
of the particular terrestrial footprint a satellite can reach from those slots.
A footprint that reaches a vast population or a wealthy population or a
politically important one can be more valuable than one that does not.
Governments seek to use such natural advantages as their terrestrialloca-
tion to gain greater economic leverage, for example, more favorable orbital
slots. Control of routes may be used to control the nature of the cargo-
what information is carried (European programming, public service pro-
gramming, anti-government programming) and what legal constraints are
imposed (for example, indecency regulation or prohibitions on subversion
or the advocacy of terror). Improvements in satellites add further complex-
ities, just as changing shipping technologies did in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century trade routes.3 There are moments, too, when existing
patterns of trade routes are altered, sometimes permanently, by war, new
technology or changing patterns of consumption. For the traditional trade
routes, the opening of the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal reduced once
important points on the trade route compass to impotency and brought
new sites to prominence. Transitions from one direct broadcast satellite
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format to another or the introduction of communication satellite paths that
do not rely on geostationary satellites may also change the relative value
of orbital slots. Governments maintain the value of some orbits (their fa-
vored ports) rather than others by outlawing some receivers so as to pre-
serve and enforce their determination as to preferred orbital slots and
satellite systems (Price, 1994). They place pressure on channel service pro-
viders (the new networks) to use favored carriers, like Spain favoring His-
pansat or Egypt Nilesat or Turkey Turksat. These deliberate governmental
interventions increase the value of some trade routes and reduce others to
nothingness. Low earth orbital satellites, much greater in number, with very
different characteristics, may replace old technologies; and, combined with
the Internet, may render existing attributes of value less reliable. Trade
routes have always defined markets. They enrich the immediate environ-
ments of the ports of call by creating subsidiary needs for commercial sup-
port, such as the building or maintenance of ships or the provision of
housing for those who came to ensure the security of the routes themselves.
The route itself implied a particular form of trade, a scope of trade, a set
of demands that were the very product of the route.4 The opening of new
routes in the sky for the distribution of images has radically altered the
strategies of transnational corporations, just as the opening of new
eighteenth-century routes altered the strategies of their equivalent business
entities. These new routes in the sky also require new definitions of markets,
as when states use the capacity of the new technology and the routes that
are made available to reach out to their diaspora populations.
All of this suggests the need for a richer understanding of the geopolitical,
economic, and technical factors that determine who controls which orbital
slots, what satellites gain access to those slots and what program services
are actually carried. Much of the literature of globalization deals only with
the last point and its supposed cultural impact. But an understanding of
the infrastructure-the way satellite routes come into being and are regu-
lated-is necessary for an assessment of the consequences of information
and entertainment flows. One way to begin this process is to examine some
examples-small case studies-of the differentiation of satellite patterns.
These examples help show how the struggles of users, governments and the
international community mirror similar events in earlier efforts to control
paths of commerce.
TONGA AND CONTROL OF ORBITAL SLOTS
A first example involves the Kingdom of Tonga, a bold pioneer in cre-
ating political control of orbital slots and turning that control to economic
advantage (Ezor, 1993). In the late twentieth century, bureaucratic wiliness,
not armed force, allowed Tonga to accomplish its objective of becoming a
power in information routes. Assertions of the right to control these ephem-
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eraI harbors for the shipment of data must traverse the International Tel-
ecommunication Union (ITU) and its World Administrative Radio
Conferences (now known as WRCs). Modern bureaucracies, not distant
potentates, determine the existence of routes. It is neither papal decrees nor
regal ordinances, but bland officials in Geneva that organize lines on maps
of commercial consequence (Thompson, 1996). The dominant figures in
the battle for control over orbital slots wear suits, shirts and ties, not naval
uniforms. Trade routes emerge because of complex compromises and in-
terrelationships among issues, not the sheer exercise of cannons or the
clever use of sophisticated maps.s
Tonga has been one of the most dramatic actors in the process of ac-
quiring orbital slots. Tonga was once representative of the point of view
that equatorial nations ought to have preferred access, almost by natural
law, to the geostationary orbit in outer space above. The equatorial states
asserted this right in the 1976 Bogota Declaration (Gorove, 1991). The
view was argued in contrast to the strongly asserted position of the indus-
trialized West that outer space was a kind of public domain not belonging
a priori to any state. The view of Tonga and others conflicted with inter-
national precepts that favored the highly developed nations by allocating
orbital slots to those countries first to have the financial and technological
resources to use the slots for satellites.6
In the 1980s, the ITU adopted a policy that, while rejecting the assertion
of the equatorial nations, did establish a process for claiming an orbital
slot which sought to leave some leeway for developing countries. Member
states could file their intention to use a slot. Then, if they in fact used it
within a reasonable period, they would actually have control of that slot.?
Tonga used this paper filing opportunity more than any other country. It
obtained claims on seven valuable slots even without drawing on its status
as an equatorial state. As with their counterparts, the terrestrial trade
routes, Tonga transferred use of its space to others, private telecommuni-
cations corporations, for economic benefits. Because neither the ITU nor
the "paper-satellite" countries had any means of policing the slot once a
corporation launched its satellite there, the orbital slot effectively became
a commodity controlled by the leasing corporate entity.
By 1997, the international community, at the ITU Radio Conference,
modified the procedures to lessen the likelihood of Tonga-like occupation
or warehousing of orbital slots. The 1997 plan shortened the length of time
a satellite application could remain on file from nine years (six plus an
automatic three-year extension) to seven years (five years plus a two-year
extension, conditional on an indication that a satellite was not launched
despite good faith efforts to do so). Still, an effort to impose financial pre-
requisites for the posting of allocation claims was beaten back. Language
endorsing "equitable access" was retained, recognizing some desire to en-
sure representation for developing countries. This compromise measure
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gained support from Tonga and other equatorial countries. It was also
favored by satellite businesses that preferred using these countries as ports
of entry, rather than other, more truculent and difficult holders of orbital
rights.
In March 1998, the national satellite company of Tonga, Tongasat, to-
gether with Russian-owned and registered Inspace Corp., announced a plan
to launch an ambitious fleet of satellites to serve the Asian Pacific region,
and perhaps beyond, using Tonga's seven ITU-registered slots. This "paper-
plan" to use paper-satellites, if it were to occur, would have made Tonga
a major telecommunications service provider, allowing the country to re-
alize the profits of using its orbital slots, rather than only the income from
selling the airspace (Keith-Reid, 1998). This plan has not been realized.
Think of this Tongan experience, repeated elsewhere, in trade route
terms. A geographical location (be it an ocean port or an orbital slot) might
have the potential to be of great value to traders. For it to become an active
site within a trading pattern, however, requires more: a degree of invest-
ment, security, establishment of a physical port with attendant facilities.
Tonga had gained the right to a slot, but only with further activity could
that slot actually become part of a route that would bring financial and
other benefits to Tonga. Sione Kite, then-managing director of Tongasat
said, "We will prove the world wrong. They never expected us to have
satellites up there in their wildest dreams."8 Tonga's creative use of the
definitions of "rights" to orbital slots is a gloss on the idea of the West's
technological dominance in the demarcation of satellite use. We could com-
pare revisionist historical accounts that criticize the predominant view of
European dynamism in the demarcation of terrestrial trade routes from the
seventeenth century onwards.9 It is probable that some important tradi-
tional ports, part of the complex of seventeenth-century trade routes,
gained their significance not through selection by the East India Company
or its counterparts, or by location alone, but by the initiative and ingenuity
of preexisting political forces.
Ironically, the United States, which had been one of the strongest critics
of Tongasat on the international scene, indirectly acknowledged that spec-
ulation in orbital slots was acceptable. The United States did this in 1996
through the auctioning by the Federal Communications Commission of an
orbital slot for direct broadcasting services (DBS), alleged at the time to be
the last DBS slot capable of "seeing" all of the continental United States.
MCI agreed in 1996 to pay $682 million for this slot-a staggering sum
that reinforced the point that some points on trade routes are more valuable
than others.
The MCI DBS auction purchase also illustrated another point about or-
bital slots: that numerous countries may have claims to similar slots, lead-
ing to potential conflicts as we move in communications to a world with
new mapping and new forms of boundaries. After MCI agreed to pay the
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huge price for its DBS slot, other companies suddenly became interested in
Canadian and Mexican slots that offer the potential for a footprint that
covers most of the United States, therefore theoretically able to reach the
most lucrative audience in the world. This aspiration for competing slots
would have been based on the general U.S. position that the distinction
between the "domestic" and "international" satellite systems was no longer
a meaningful one. The U.S. effort has been to establish the principle, largely
based on the WTO agreement on telecommunications, that satellite trans-
missions should not stop at national borders. MCI was not pleased to find
out that others might receive-for free or at greatly reduced prices-orbital
slots somewhat similar to the one that MCI bought with a promise from
the United States that it was the "last" of its type. Of course, MCl's un-
happiness in this regard may be an illustration of a point that applied to
trade routes as well: Investing heavily in one trade route for profit is usually
accompanied by efforts to ensure that competitors cannot establish a route
in the immediate vicinity.
The story of Tonga is, of course, an anomaly. As with trade routes of
the past, it was not the actual, physical, terrestrial route or the points of
transportation that ultimately counted, but the economic and political
forces that controlled trade along those routes. Even if orbital slots are
widely distributed among states, the arrangements to control satellites
themselves, and the ultimate predominance of the West in the satellite
trade, makes the analogy to the past more striking (Curtin, 1984).
COMPETITION TO CONTROL THE SATELLITES
Let us, thus, turn from the orbital slots themselves to the satellites that
fill them. If the slots are the trade route equivalent of ports of call, then
the satellites can be likened to the great trading vessels, especially when the
entire system of uploading and downloading of signals is taken into ac-
count. Here there are many dramatic stories. One of the most dramatic
involves the effort of private corporations seeking to break government
satellite monopolies, mirroring, perhaps, swashbuckling efforts to enter
government-controlled trade in the eigthteenth century. Take, fo,. example,
the long struggle of Rene Anselmo, creator of the fiercely independent
PanAmSat, a U.S. private satellite operator later associated with Hughes
Electronics, against the intergovernmental body that has been Intelsat. An-
selmo saw that Intelsat, concentrating on the satellite transmission of data
and telephone messages, was ignoring a trade opportunity for the shipment
and distribution of broadcast signals through satellites. Anselmo saw an
unserved geographical market as well, using satellites to link the United
States to Latin America and to link parts of Latin America to one another. lO
Intelsat, like the trading companies of old, used government power, trea-
ties, discriminatory pricing and other techniques in the late 1980s and early
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1990s to maintain its monopoly and squelch PanAmSat and Anselmo. ll
PanAmSat used a clever capability of navigating various government bu-
reaucracies and banking firms to gain a foothold. The existence of these
carriers meant new markets. The boom in global broadcasting channels,
such as CNN, meant a profitable cargo source for PanAmSat.
The rise of the deregulatory mentality endorsing the theme of competi-
tion and of multilateral trade agreements in which government restrictions
would be reduced, magnified opportunities for PanAmSat to deliver its sig-
nals to earth stations in Europe and elsewhere. In a cocktail of his own
metaphors, Anselmo wailed about the monopoly in 1990 when he sought
greater freedom to carry data over his system as well as video channels:
"We were sent into battle with this monstrous worldwide telephone cartel
with both hands tied behind our back.... Intelsat's response to PanAmSat
was to launch a global boycott of the company, lobby to prevent and stall
the launch of our satellite, and start a war of predatory pricing to drive us
out of the market. And that was only the tip of the iceberg of unfairness
that they have thrown at US."12 Once the monopoly was avoided, An-
selmo's company succeeded wildly, challenging the rules of access and use
of trade routes in the sky.
There are many other stories about the use of control over satellites to
gain the profits of the trade, other chapters in the drama of establishing
empires of the sky. In the 1990s, Luxembourg's Societe Europeene des
Satellites (SES) came into existence with its Astra satellite series offering
the most aggressive opening to a broadly European audience. This satellite
company is responsible for more than 75 percent of Europe's direct-to-
home audience. Again echoing the history of trading companies, a consor-
tium of banks with substantial public investment owns it. 13 At the end of
the decade, SES was in high-stakes, fierce competition for a single point on
the geostationary orbit, the valuable 29 degrees east satellite position reach-
ing Europe.14 SES claimed the right to that airspace, based on varying
interpretations of a 1997 World Administrative Radio Conference Agree-
ment, but so had Deutsche Telekom. Both had already placed satellites in
that airspace in dangerous proximity. Eutelsat planned to launch a third
within that same 28-29 degree space by the year 2000, violating the norm
that satellites are usually positioned at least three degrees apart. IS With the
ITU as decision-maker, SES obtained the slot.
A third element of the infrastructure involves the programming services
that use the satellite, much like the shippers whose cargoes filled the vessels
of seventeenth-century trade routes. Just as those trade routes reorganized
markets for goods, satellite footprints reorganize markets for information.
There are numerous examples of trade routes creating the possibility of
trade and of physical distribution patterns inspiring new approaches to
them. One recent example is Alfa TV.16 Established by 25 countries in
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, AHa TV was
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proposed as a multilingual channel "to promote cooperation and reconcil-
iation" in the region. With the support of the European Parliament and
the European funding project called Eureka Audiovisuel, its task would be
to use films and other cultural programs to reach an audience estimated at
400 million viewers, from Finland to Azerbaijan. Like other trans-European
channels, such as the German-French Arte and the regional Euronews, Alfa-
TV is presenting itself as an alternative to the oft-cited flood of American
culture. It is the existence of new satellite routes that makes Alfa-TV and
its cohorts possible, just as it was the existence of the great new foci of
Hudson Bay and Goa that created new forms of cross-cultural imagining,
respectively, between English, French and Native American fur traders or
Portuguese, Asian and African in earlier times. Like these centers of trade,
which were not exclusively dominated by anyone cultural group, alter-
natives such as Alfa-TV resist the imposition of one cultural model in the
ever-expanding stream of information available by satellite (Curtin, 1984).
THE LAW OF SATELLITE TRADE ROUTES
One of the most intriguing questions is whether particular trade routes-
historically or at present-are selected not just for their geographical span,
but because of the legal environment that surrounds them: whether there
is a relationship of pathway to law, and law to cargo. Points within dis-
tribution patterns traditionally have barred certain cargo or put them in
quarantine (one can think of animals or seeds or people). Such rules may
have made some routes preferable to others. Now we can ask how gov-
ernments that have control over an orbital slot regulate its use to affect the
cargo in programming. In 1993, for example, the Secretary of State for
what was then National Heritage (now Culture, Media and Sport) in the
United Kingdom sought to block the marketing of subscriptions to allegedly
pornographic broadcasts arriving in the country via direct broadcast sat-
ellite (i.e., a signal that came straight from a satellite to a small receiver at
a person's home or place of business). The particular route selected for the
delivery of the service, called Erotica Rendez-Vous, involved the "uplink-
ing" (the sending from the ground) of the signal from France to a tran-
sponder within the Eutelsat satellite system for transmission into the United
Kingdom.
The route selected meant that the legal structure of the European Union
applied to this transmission, especially the 1989 Television Without Fron-
tiers Directive. Under that regime, the law precludes officials in the recipient
country, in this case the United Kingdom, from unilaterally prohibiting the
programming, as could have been the case had the programming originated
from outside the European Union. Because of the trade route selected by
the programming source, the United Kingdom was obliged to mediate with
the host authority, in this case France, to discuss its official finding that
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British standards were violated. Under the European law applied to images
distributed within the Union, if distribution of Erotica Rendez-Vous is law-
ful in the country of origin (or where the sender is established), then under
the Directive, UK officials cannot act alone to block it. The European Di-
rective gives member states the power to "suspend retransmission" of a
service (originating from within the Union) only if it "manifestly, gravely
and seriously" harms children by "impairing their moral development," as
defined in Article 22 of the Directive. The United Kingdom and France may
have sharply different views on what constitutes manifest and grave im-
pairment of a child's moral developmentY
It is still somewhat unclear what British officials can do, even with a
domestic law that provides the secretary of state to "proscribe" a foreign
satellite service deemed to be "unacceptable." Many are the voices that say
that regulation of programming as cargo is not only indefensible, but also
technologically impossible. Still, the British government can preclude cable
television operators from carrying a violating signal that arrives via satellite;
it can try to prevent the sale of decoders and it can make it a crime to
market a proscribed signal or to advertise in connection with such a signal.
What it cannot actually do is make the signal itself go away. In terms of
trade routes, the significance of European law is that the transportation of
signals from one country within the Union to another is a trade route with
a law of content that differs from a trade route that originates outside the
Union.
MED-TV
A quite different story about the cultural and political implications of
the choice of trade route involves an extraordinary satellite service called
MED-TV. MED-TV was established in London to distribute programming
via satellite to the Kurdish population worldwide. MED-TV especially
sought to reach Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Its program-
ming, produced in large part in Belgium, was a mix of news, entertainment
and education, important to a historically diasporic community of 35 mil-
lion engaged in, among other things, trying to rediscover and redefine
Kurdish nationhood and reaffirm its language and culture. Naomi Sakr has
called MED-TV a "kind of Kurdistan in space," as it provided a culturally
unifying function despite the lack of a Kurdish homeland or single terri-
torial base. Satellite broadcasting has proven a superior method of infor-
mation exchange amongst Kurdish people because it neither relied on
literacy (levels remain low, especially among women who remain in the
home) nor involved complications of print media ranging from unstable
mailing addresses to state censorship and circulation prohibitions. The serv-
ice was also relatively inexpensive and was obtainable even in remote vil-
lages (Sakr, 1999).
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Not all saw the implications of MED-TV in such a positive light. Turkey
viewed MED-TV as virtually the media arm of the PKK, the separatist
Kurdish force that has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkish gov-
ernment troops and has been deemed by Turkey to be a significant threat
to the integrity and indivisibility of the country.IS
For an entity like MED-TV, selection of a trade route for the distribution
of its images was a complex matter. It sought a mode that would involve
the least possible intervention, either directly by Turkey or by other gov-
ernments at Turkey's behest. For example, its transmission was originally
on the Hotbird satellite. But for viewers to turn their receiving dishes to
Hotbird meant they were conspicuous in comparison to their neighbors,
whose dishes were turned to a different, Eutelsat-originated satellite, which
carried traditional Turkish entertainment channel services. The difference
in the attitude of the dish could be perceived by the authorities. To protect
its viewers, MED-TV had to shift, therefore, from Hotbird to Eutelsat.
Another element of political choice of route arose from the very tran-
sponders on the Eutelsat system that would be used by MED-TV. Access
to Eutelsat's transponders, given the structure of the satellite service (it is
owned by Eurovision, a cooperative effort of state entities), has political
implications. These transponders are controlled by public agencies; the
states that control those agencies have relations with Turkey. Stories were
told of MED-TV securing time on a Slovakian-controlled time slot only to
have the Turkish Foreign Minister obtain a cancellation through bilateral
discussions. MED-TV was unceremoniously bounced from various tran-
sponders on Eutelsat and their contracts for access canceled. Put in trade
route terms, because of the contraband nature/status of the cargo, the re-
liability of MED-TV's cargo arrangements was at risk.
One solace, an anchor, as it were, was MED-TV's license, or authori-
zation to broadcast. Whatever their political goals, the choice of a relatively
secure legal and political system that would govern the delivery of their
information was one of MED-TV's most important goals and was a vital
part of the strategy for obtaining transponder space to reach the relevant
audience. The organization "established" itself in the United Kingdom, a
technical term that meant that they were qualified, under British law, to
receive a license from the UK's Independent Television Commission. This
resulted in MED-TV's being subject to the lTC's content standards. How-
ever, receiving a British permit allowed MED-TV to claim that it met British
broadcasting standards. This might, therefore, increase the chances that its
programming would be subject only to legal, as opposed to extra-legal,
constraints. At the danger of pushing the metaphor too far, the MED-TV
decision could be perceived as a rough equivalent of flying the British flag
on the main mast.
Turkish officials mounted an extensive campaign to pressure the British
government to withdraw MED-TV's license and close the producer down.
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They contended that MED-TV was a "political organization" and
therefore, under UK legislation, precluded from obtaining a British license.
In February 1998, the Independent Television Commission, charged with
supervision of licensed entities in Britain, penalized MED-TV for three
broadcasts, for a total fine of approximately $150,000. According to the
Commission, .despite formal warnings, MED-TV violated the impartiality
requirements of lTC's programming code. In one breach, according to the
lTC, a "40-minute long program consisted entirely of a political rally or-
ganized by the PKK." The violation was that "No context was supplied
and there was no balancing material." In a second breach of impartiality
requirements, MED-TV "seemingly endorsed" the on-camera condemna-
tion of a United States list of terrorist organizations. A third transgression
of the lTC's rules (involving neutrality of journalists) involved "personal
comments" from a MED-TV journalist in the field, namely a description
of the more pro-government Kurdish Democratic Party as "treacherous and
murderous."19 Finally, in 1999, the ITC withdrew the license, finding that
the station had too often violated standards of objectivity and impartiality.
Soon thereafter, MED-TV closed down.
The point here is not the validity of the ITC decisions, but the legal and
political consequences for MED-TV of choosing (or being forced by cir-
cumstances to choose) a particular route for the origination and transpor-
tation of its satellite-borne information. MED-TV, in fact, could be the
poster-child for the idea that there are vital implications, in terms of the
capacity to achieve a safe passage between sender and receiver, of the choice
of path for transmission. MED-TV's history has been one not only of Brit-
ish sanctions, but, within Turkey, specific army and police raids to destroy
satellite receiving antennas that would be capable of retrieving the MED-
TV signal. Those in charge of the Kurdish broadcasting entity were con-
stantly searching for alternative means of assuring a route in which access
to production facilities, uplinking, satellite access and downlinking into
Turkey could be achieved as seamlessly as possible, free of government
intervention.
Although MED-TV was on some levels a success, the hostilities toward
it and the successful attempts to close it down, should prompt a reeval-
uation of some of the predictions for the potential of satellite communi-
cations. Channels like MED-TV are both "deterrestrialized," meaning that
they address audiences in multiple geopolitical territories, and "deterrito-
rialized," in that they may be based abroad, target primarily foreign au-
diences, and hire foreign nationals. The "deterritorialized" world can be
seen as organized vertically into nation-states and horizontally into "over-
lapping, permeable multiple system[s] of interaction," along lines of shared
interests, opinions, beliefs, tastes, ethnicities and religions. For some time,
scholars have been weighing the implications of the supposedly disinte-
grating value of territory. In 1961 historian Arnold Toynbee posited that
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in the information age, diasporas could be "the wave of the future," sup-
planting the nation-state. Waves of information can serve to affirm nations
that supersede existing states, or they can affirm the power of existing
nation-states, reaffirming and relegitimizing their existence and their regu-
latory powers (Toynbee & Castells, cited in Verlhust, 1999).
States have passed stringent laws regarding access to satellite channels.
These measures are imperfect at best: Cheaper and easier access to tech-
nology, from satellite dishes to wireless cable systems, enable the flouting
of regulations such as the bans on satellite dishes in Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Furthermore, sporadic enforcement of the ban in Saudi Arabia and decla-
rations that the ban was unconstitutional in Iran have rendered these meas-
ures ineffectual. Even in Algeria, where a military coup in 1992 ended that
country's political aperture, residents continued to turn to francophone
news and analysis. Sharing satellite dishes and "improvised cabling" (read
"stealing") further lower the cost of obtaining satellite transmissions. Gov-
ernments can no more prevent the spread of this contraband than the Span-
ish viceregal government could entirely prevent the circulation of yellowing
philosophical texts. Furthermore, technology allows its spread to happen
at a much greater speed and reaches a much wider audience.
There is a much more powerful restraint on this spread of information
than attempts to rid remote villages and urban shantytowns of their tele-
vision access, namely control of the material being broadcast. Although
access to satellite television can cost as little as U.S.$10 per month, the
start-up costs for a channel runs into the millions. The Saudi Middle East
Broadcasting Centre (MBC) was half-jokingly referred to as "My Broad-
casting Company," as within several years the financial support of private
investors apparently shifted to King Fahd and his associates. As we have
seen before, even those private channels broadcasting from outside the re-
gion (based instead in England, France or Italy, to circumvent state restric-
tions on content) are subject to international pressure exerted by incensed
governments and the preferences and judgments of private management
and investors. Power relations within individual states and between them
drive satellite transmission in the Arab world in a far greater way than had
been optimistically predicted.20
ORBITAL SLOTS AS CULTURAL GATEWAYS
There are other examples, often trade related, in which countries have
used slots from time to time to regulate access of information and enter-
tainment to their populations, much as governments have often used ports
of entry as a caliber of openness. Some countries, such as Malaysia, control
trade routes by establishing a monopoly of information distribution in a
favored orbital slot and restricting the use of the slot by limiting channel
services to the control of those friendly to the government. Canada wishes
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to enforce its Canadian cultural content effort by prohibiting its citizens
from gaining access to signals that travel through orbital slots not under
Canadian control. It has, in the past, sought to criminalize the sale of re-
ceivers that allow the receipt of signals from satellites in orbital slots of
American origin. Iraq has prohibited and confiscated satellite dishes capable
of receiving signals from the West, particularly transmissions thought to be
culturally subversive. There is some distant affinity to trade routes here, in
the use of points of entry to control the kinds of products that would
otherwise pass to affected populations, or in other words, the use of the
power of the trade route for cultural screening. The BBC published excerpts
of recorded prayer sermons at Teheran University on September 16, 1994,
by an Imam for whom screening and banning was essential:
Satellite transmission, broadcasting the programs of foreign television networks, is
not designed to increase the scientific knowledge of nations. Rather it has been
developed to mislead the youth.... They [the West] do not transfer their knowl-
edge ... [or] their experience of modernizing technology. What they transfer is
something which drags families into corruption.21
Such cultural screening is by no means unique to the Islamic world. Al-
most two centuries ago, in its efforts to retain its tenuous hold on its Amer-
ican colonies, Spain prohibited the transport, sale and distribution of
subversive documentation inspired by Enlightenment philosophy. National
and international regulation of trade routes is a complicated matter. The
debates discussed in the ITU on actual control of orbital slots, the concept
of "equitable access," and the debate between the developed and devel-
oping countries over a priori and a posteriori approaches to regulation,
have not been the only ones to arise. Twenty years ago in the United
Nations, countries were already debating whether an international regime
could be established that controlled the content in the trade of images. A
sweeping draft convention would have imposed a set of substantive stan-
dards on satellite-delivered information, excluding from television pro-
grams transmitted by satellites "any material publicizing ideas of war,
militarism, nazism, national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples
as well as material which is immoral or instigative in nature or is otherwise
aimed at interfering the domestic affairs or foreign policy of other States."22
CONCLUSION
The complexity of corporate structures, the intricate relationships be-
tween business ventures and governments in the satellite field, and the dif-
ficulty of public accessibility of contracts for the transmission of program
services, all turn the current, intricate patterns of transportation of satellite
images around the world into a black box of unknown content. Scholar-
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ship, partly as a consequence, has looked at what seemed most apparent
about this traffic for a very long time, namely that programming has its
source in values and in production in the West, often the United States,
and its impact elsewhere (Schiller, 1976; Tunstall, 1977). But as this picture
changes, details will be far more important, including details about the
ways trade routes in imagery and data are shaped and restricted. This will
have to include closer examination of how governments use such powers
as they still attempt to retain control of the ways information is received
within their borders, and how they use their control over orbital slots.23
Not for nothing has the rhetoric of the global entrepreneurs, like Rupert
Murdoch, changed from the claim of borderless skies to a claim of defer-
ence to states.
Trade routes, of whatever vintage, have always been constituted of a
series of physical points where ownership or control has been vital. More
than that, however, these points, taken together, had geopolitical implica-
tions as they transformed into ports, concessions, warehouses, colonies,
sources of raw material and markets for products. For the old trade routes,
any government or power seeking to maintain the value of any particular
point along the route was expected to struggle for that point's exclusivity,
its competitive advantage, or its access to raw materials or markets. Trade
routes in the sky, too, have their elements of exclusivity. Orbital slots have
increased value if they or the satellites that occupy them do not increase in
supply or if the demand for them keeps exploding in volume. For the sat-
ellite routes, as for their predecessors, technology increases supply while
participants seek to retain control and quasi-monopolistic power.
In the broadcast era, when terrestrial transmitters were the exclusive
technology, international concern had, historically, been to avoid the pos-
sible invasion of the domestic space of one country from its neighbor, es-
pecially for propaganda purposes. There were exceptions, such as the
implicit acceptance of short-wave radio as a space for transnational serv-
ices, symbolized by the use of spectrum by the BBC, the Voice of America
and hundreds of other external services. But bilateral agreements-for ex-
ample, between Mexico and the United States-were designed to insure
minimal intrusion along the long borders. In the Cold War, the Eastern
bloc's choice of SECAM for its color television technology was a techno-
logical break with the West's PAL. With the recent inception of the post-
Soviet era, the use of international pathways for external services, like
Radio Liberty, has been freshly debated. There are new disputes about
Radio Marti, directed at Cuba, and Radio Free Asia, directed, among other
places, at China and Vietnam, showing that traditional technologies con-
tinue to play an important role in the transportation of political imagery.
For the first 50 years of broadcasting, the entire motivation of a virtually
united international community was to establish trade routes that assumed
a national gatekeeper. With some important exceptions, "harm" was
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largely defined as the intentional spillover of spectrum use from one na-
tional zone into another. Terrestrially, the use of directional antennas, the
reduction of power and the careful designation of spectrum were sufficient
largely to accomplish the international consensus. As a 1930s international
covenant put it:
The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises,
to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any
transmission which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such
a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with
the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party.24
Today, despite the fact that the technological capabilities of the satellite
implicate issues of national identity, there is no international consensus on
the rules that should guide the establishment of trade routes in the sky.
The world is sharply divided into camps on how and whether to restrict
routes by which that content gets delivered. Some consider that transpor-
tation in images should (indeed, must) be subject to national controls. Ma-
laysia and India, in recent broadcast reform proposals, require that any
information or imagery that is sent down from a satellite to people within
its borders must first arise from within the territory, a so-called uplinking
requirement. The tendency of some countries to require uplinking within
their boundaries is an example of what Saskia Sassen has called reinstalling
the local (Sassen, 1996, 1998). Despite the dizzying potential for free
exchange of information available through satellites, some states are at-
tempting to assert a sort of digital trade monopoly, exclusively controlling
the exchange and distribution of information transmitted by satellite, or at
the very least its points of entry and departure.25
On the other hand, multilateral trade negotiations which resulted in the
World Trade Organization have dramatically asserted the idea of reducing
barriers to free flow of services, including information and programs. The
position has often been sounded that free trade in goods and economic
growth is not possible without a free trade in information. As part of the
ideology surrounding these multilateral negotiations, government restric-
tions on transmission of imagery and programming whether tied to na-
tional assertions or not, are condemned as violations of the human right
to receive or impart information. The U.S. position, consistent with these
views, is generally to assert that access to orbital slots, to licenses, and to
markets should be as free as possible of public regulation. But, as we have
seen, free trade does not necessarily mean random patterns of distributing
information.
These new trade routes are not visible, linear, nor functionally evolved
from prior methodologies. Invisible and "post-modern," the new routes
will break some traditional categories, but reinforce others. They will criss-
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cross regional lines, produce information spills such as pornography on the
Internet, and allow diasporic groups to communicate among themselves.
Seemingly indivisible by national boundaries, these routes prod existing
sovereigns to search for ways in which these borders can be rehabilitated.
They are almost solely about trade in information, though trade in infor-
mation leads to changes in trade and development of physical products.
Enveloped in technology, masked by complexity, it is apparent that the
configuration of these satellite routes have an important relationship to
democracy and culture and to the spaces for public debate. A focus on the
details of these structures of distribution, the satellite routes of the distant
firmament, is a necessary aspect of communications studies in the future.
NOTES
The author would like to acknowledge Henry Goldberg, Julian McGougan and
Phillip Spector, who reviewed this chapter and made very useful comments. Kristina
A. Boylan also assisted in historical research and revision.
1. Until the mid-nineteenth century, international, long-distance communica-
tion could be on the order of years. Steamships, canals and train reduced the lag
to months. But it was not until the invention of the telegraph cable that a same-
day exchange became possible (Curtin, 1984). Telephones, and following them, the
Internet, have reduced the time lag to seconds.
2. The ancient definition of the port, portus, is "a place through which mer-
chandise is carried." In this sense the routes and ports of the system of satellite
communication can be compared to their terrestrial predecessors (Curtin, 1984).
3. The focus of this chapter is on geostationary satellites, which have been
virtually the only kind of satellites operating commercially. Over the next few years,
however, commercial operations by low earth orbit (LEO) satellites will commence.
For these satellites, the concept of orbital slots is entirely irrelevant, but the concept
of orbital planes may nonetheless make the trade route metaphor relevant. The
orbital paths taken by LEO constellations are not randomly selected, but rather are
intended to traverse the major population zones of the world. In addition, the
satellite themselves typically are designed with steerable antennas, which enable
them to focus on populated areas even as the satellites move in and out of direct
viewable range.
4. The classic example is the "spice trade," the route from China and Southeast
Asia through to Europe developed by Asian, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean
traders. Only comparatively small quantities of pepper and spices, in comparison
to other cargoes, were transported along this route, but their high ratio of value to
weight not only made the trips worthwhile (even circumnavigation of Africa or
across the Pacific), but determined the routes and stops at ports of call as well
(Curtin, 1984).
5. The ITU (originally the International Telegraphic Union) was established in
1865. It has sought to encourage cooperation among its member countries to im-
prove global telecommunications and offer technical assistance to developing coun-
tries. Its Radio Conferences, held every second year, allocate orbital space to
member countries.
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6. This could be seen as contradictory to the first world countries' rhetoric of
free trade, which they then circumvent by enabling a preference for industrialized
nations with satellite-building capacities. A historical parallel can be found in late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British and French criticism of Spain's mo-
nopoly on trade with its American colonies. After Latin American independence,
Britain and France then vied for exclusive trade concessions with the new nations,
in seeming disregard of their earlier arguments for the benefits of opening markets
to diverse foreign trade (Miller, 1993).
7. The ITU structure that exists for registration of orbital slots developed out
of a telecommunications environment in which each country, including the United
States at the outset, was the single monopoly carrier for virtually all telecommu-
nications traffic. Intelsat was created by this "club" of carriers as a cooperative
intended to establish satellite links among the monopolies, much as the same club
members had created undersea cable links among themselves. The theory was that
each country, through (typically) its government-owned monopoly, would control
the domestic orbital slots over its own region, while Intelsat would control the
international slots. The ITU orbital slot registration process made more sense when
a telecommunications monopoly model existed than when a more open, competitive
approach evolved.
8. "Tongasat Set to Lead Asian Satellite Consortium," Communications Today,
January 19, 1998.
9. For example, Europe did not create the aforementioned links on the "spice
route" between Asia, Africa and Europe, ultimately used for European benefit. On
the contrary, the Europeans were late entries into networks of trade which had
existed for almost a thousand years previously and had been evolving since. Shifts
in political alliances and transportation technology did alter the importance and
predominance of some ports (for example, overland trading routes through Central
Asia being supplanted by maritime trade from Asia to Europe and Africa), but
overall it was not geographical innovation on the Europeans' part, but the har-
nessing of new technologies, the creation of new trade structures and an increasing
reliance on military strength to defend those structures that gave the West its pre-
dominance in world trade (Curtin, 1984).
10. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the owner of the largest U.S. Spanish-
language television network, Anselmo sought to import Spanish-language program-
ming from Latin America. Because the transmission of this programming would be
international, the FCC required Anselmo's network to use Intelsat for the trans-
missions, even though U.S. domestic satellites were technically capable of carrying
the traffic and would have done it at rates that were 50 percent or less of Intelsat's.
Although the U.S. government eventually allowed some transborder communica-
tions via U.S. domestic satellites, Anselmo became so enraged that he decided to
compete directly with Intelsat in the provision of international satellite services.
11. "PanAmSat Lobbies FCC for Greater Freedom," FinTech Telecom Markets,
July 26, 1990.
12. There is an important relationship-illustrative of the legal creation of
sites-between Anselmo's PanAmSat and the legal adventurousness of Tongasat.
When Anselmo and others filed at the FCC in the early to mid-1980s for what
were then called "separate system" licenses (because they were "separate" from the
Intelsat system), the issue of orbital slots serving international routes first arose. If
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indeed it would be possible to compete directly with Intelsat, then orbital slots over
the oceans-which theretofore had been of interest solely to Intelsat-were sud-
denly of great potential value. Tongasat, led at that time by an American entrepre-
neur, was one of the first to recognize this potential and to recognize that the ITU's
procedures essentially allowed any nation, no matter how small, to file for large
numbers of these valuable slots.
13. Following a flotation, SES has a large number of Luxembourg-based share-
holders as well.
14. This slot was valuable even though Astra already had six satellites at 19
degrees east for two reasons: First, they needed to have three degrees of separation
or they have to share frequencies, reducing their value; second, because most DBS
dishes are in a fixed position, the introduction of competition in delivery to those
dishes undermines monopoly rent.
15. "Eutelsat Promotes 290 East Slot," Cable and Satellite Express, March 26,
1998 (p. 9), available in LEXIS < World Library, ALLWLD File; "Hostilities Re-
sumed in SES-Eutelsat Star Wars," Cable and Satellite Europe, April 1998.
16. "AHa TV-A Multilingual Satellite TV for Europe and FSU," BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, January 16, 1998.
17. Regina v. Secretary of State for the National Heritage ex parte Continental
Television BV, April 30, 1993: [1993] CMLR 387 (dismissing an appeal from a
denial of injunction to prevent the United Kingdom from banning reception, view-
ing and advertising of the pornographic channel Red Hot Television, emanating
from Denmark).
18. "Turkey Calls on USA to End MED-TV Broadcasts," BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, August 30,1996; "MED-TV Off the Air after UK, Belgian Police
Raids," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 27, 1996; "Turkish Pre-
mier Discusses MED-TV with Tony Blair," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
December 19, 1997; also see Hassanpour (1995).
19. This history is recounted in Price (1998).
20. Sakr (1999), passim.
21. "Emani-Kashani: West Interested in Transfer Not of Technology but of Cor-
ruption," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 19, 1994; The Middle
East; Iran; MEl2104/MED, available in LEXIS < News Library, BBCSWB File.
22. Draft convention on principles governing the use by states of artificial earth
satellites for direct television broadcasting. U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972), art IV.
23. For a discussion of human rights and the Indian Broadcasting Bill, see Tem-
pleton (1998).
24. International convention concerning the use of broadcasting in the cause of
peace, September 23, 1936, Art. I, 186 L.N.T.S. 301.
25. The structure of Spain's restrictions on trade and exchange with its American
colonies serves as a historical parallel (Zahedieh, 1986). Of course, as Zahedieh
demonstrates, non-Spanish traders and others who wished to exploit the system
soon found ways of circumventing crown regulations, for example, by striking deals
with merchants in Seville or Cadiz to deliver non-Spanish manufactured goods to
or raw materials from the colonies, all through the legally-defined "Spanish" ports.
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